“Gaza, Gaza, you bastards… the Army of Muhammad has returned.”
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#Idlib, Idlib, you bastards… the Army of Muhammad has returned.”
What began as a protest supporting a campaign against the mother of all vices quickly turned into chants calling for the liberation of Gaza and the return of the “Army of Muhammad” in Gaza Square, Idlib.
This is not a random shift in protest slogans; it is a revealing moment that exposes a deeper structural problem with serious international implications. The rapid transformation from a socially framed campaign into openly militant, transnational rhetoric shows how easily public mobilization can be hijacked by ideological factions operating within or around the system.
There are only two realistic explanations, and both are equally damaging.
The first is deliberate tolerance or indirect facilitation. In this scenario, authorities are aware of these factions and allow them space to operate either to channel public anger, manufacture street pressure, or maintain ideological leverage. This kind of controlled chaos may appear tactically useful in the short term, but it is strategically reckless. Once these groups gain visibility and momentum, they stop being tools and become actors with independent, often absolutist and expansionist agendas.
The second possibility is a failure of control. If the government cannot prevent such rhetoric and mobilization, it reveals a fundamental weakness in its authority. A system that cannot regulate radicalized factions within its own territory cannot claim real sovereignty or present itself as a reliable international partner.
What makes this situation even more contradictory is the government’s broader geopolitical positioning. It is effectively aligned, directly or indirectly with Western priorities, particularly in countering the Iranian axis. Yet it is allowing, or failing to suppress, rhetoric that invokes transnational jihadist mobilization centered on Gaza. This contradiction is not sustainable. For international actors, especially the United States and its allies, there is no meaningful distinction between managed extremist rhetoric and genuine security threats.
The risks are immediate and cumulative: loss of credibility, as any attempt to portray the government as a stabilizing force collapses in the face of such scenes; increased risk of sanctions or continued isolation, as these signals reinforce the argument that the environment remains unsafe and ideologically volatile; attraction of transnational networks, as such rhetoric can draw in foreign fighters, funding channels, and ideological alignment with broader extremist movements; and internal destabilization, as allowing these factions to operate accelerates fragmentation and weakens centralized control.
Whether this is intentional or a failure, the outcome is the same. It reflects a governing structure that relies on volatility to maintain relevance but is increasingly unable to contain the forces it enables. That is not just a domestic issue; it is a direct trigger for international concern and long-term instability.
